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FHDELITY AS TRANSLATION: COLLOQUY
PROFESSOR GREENE: We will give Professor Lessig a chance
to respond and then we will open it up.
PROFESSOR LESSIG: I think Jed's right. I don't believe in a gen-
eralized theory, a universal hermeneutics, useable to figure out consti-
tutional theory generally. With that much I agree completely. But
there is a suggestion at the end of what Jed said that I do want to
disagree with. This is Jed's focus on the writtenness of constitutional-
ism as it gets expressed in paradigm cases. I think this is a kind of
universalism itself. And there are two problems with this sort of
universalism.
First, I am not sure how paradigm cases are any different from origi-
nal understandings of texts. They present, it seems to me, the very
same problem: Once we have a paradigm case, just as with an original
understanding of an original text, we must still say how to understand
its continuing significance. What frightens me is that paradigm cases
become easy ways for the one-step originalist to insist: "Here is how
they thought about it, and so too should we." But I think that it takes
something more to understand what we do with an original text, or
original and paradigm case. We need a theory to carry it forward.
For Jed, this something more is his emphasis on "writtenness." But
this raises the second problem. Writing has multiple purposes. We
might think that a constitution aims to codify certain values. Or we
might think that a constitution aims to transform certain values, or
features of the people being constituted. Our Constitution tried to do
both. The Constitution that Akhil Amar writes of-1791, the Bill of
Rights-is in large part a constitution that codifies values that the
people expressed. These values were part of their tradition, and their
constitution aimed to carry these values forward. The Reconstruction
Amendments, however, were transformative. They were about saying
that part of who we were had to change. Writtenness is used in both
contexts, but for very different ends. It is not clear to me how a uni-
versal theory about writtenness addresses that.
The universalist point is something that Sandy pointed to as well,
but there is a first part to Sandy's contribution that I really want to
question. I know that it is fun to embrace our American ignorance; I
embrace it as well. Of course, I confess, I am not a translator (except I
have, in fact, done Dante two or three times. Just as an exercise). But
it is not true, Sandy, that you have never translated. You translate all
the time, in the sense in which translation is being offered by me, and I
also think by Professor Dworkin.
What is translation in this sense? Obviously, it is not a particular
practice of looking words up in dictionaries and carrying words into
different languages. It is translation in the sense that James Boyd
White speaks of. It is translation in the sense of first understanding
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that you must understand a text or a person or a statement, whether in
English or any other language, according to the perspective or the
world from which it is being expressed, and then second, carry that
meaning into your own world, in a way that helps you understand
what is being said. There is no life in expression without translation in
this sense. And it is this sense that I suggest translation is behind un-
derstanding the practice that I describe of taking a text that is 200
years old and attempting to find a meaning in it that continues today.
It is true that the way translations function differs. Translations of
Shakespeare, translations of music, translations of Beethoven-each
of these are different acts. There is a great piece by Judge Richard
Posner titled Bork and Beethoven reviewing two articles that appeared
in an issue of Commentary. In the first article, Bork is talking about
the virtues of originalism, and in the very next article, another author
is criticizing original interpretations of Beethoven. Isn't it odd, Posner
asks, that this conservative publication is originalist with respect to
one and not originalist with respect to the other? The answer is, no, it
is not odd at all. Why? Because the function of the enterprise is going
to be different in these different contexts. Because I am not a univer-
salist, as Jed reminds me, I don't have to be committed to the same
practice across these contexts.
Now, I said that the theory of translation operates on two levels.
The first level is the negative use of translation theory, which is the
"turning the tables" that Jim Fleming was talking about earlier. The
second level is the positive use of translation theory. The positive use
asks how much of the past does translation explain descriptively, and
how much does it justify?
Professor Calabresi's criticisms track this second level, the positive
theory. He asks, how fine-grained is this positive account going to be?
I guess my response to that is this: My first training was as an econo-
mist. As an economist, I used regression techniques to estimate equa-
tions to explain how the economy was working. That raised in me an
intuition about how theory is to work. Theory is to explain as much as
possible; or at least, it is to describe an equation with variables that
are significant in explaining what is to be explained.
In constitutional theory, a theory doesn't have to explain much for
it to be a lot better than a lot of other theories out there. In particu-
lar, a theory doesn't have to explain much for it to be better than the
theory (implicitly relied upon by Calabresi) focused on text and origi-
nal tradition. This is because the text and original tradition didn't
change in the relevant periods, yet readings of the constitution did. To
understand change, you need to track change; a constant doesn't ex-
plain change.
The question thus is, do we have a theory that explains the shifts in,
say, the period of 1935-41? One part of explaining the shifts is timing,
no doubt. Bruce Ackerman's theory is great for that. Here we have
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great timing, at least to the extent that he is talking about the New
Deal and Reconstruction changes. (He, too, will face the problem
about timing, when he gets into the synthesis half of his story, asking
why is it that it is 1954 before Brown v. Board of Education' is the
synthesis of moment two and moment three.) But another part of
explaining the shifts is to ask whether there are enough moving parts
in the account to give us a theory that will describe the changes?
All that I wanted to suggest here is that any theory that does not try
to incorporate what Abner was talking about - that does not try to
incorporate talk about contested and uncontested discourses and the
relationship that they have to the institutional competence of a
court-seems to me to be missing an extraordinary dynamic.
Now with Abner I have one disagreement and one strong agree-
ment. First the agreement: Abner is right to say that my "activist con-
testability stuff" and my "deference contestability stuff' will not cut
along the line of rights and powers. The line is more complicated than
that. That is absolutely correct. I have to go back and work on that.
But, one thing that troubled me about his description of the defer-
ence point is that this deference to uncontested discourses sounds too
active. The interesting feature about relatively uncontested discourses
is their invisibility. Not that everybody agrees with them. The point is
how some discourses just exist in the background, whether contested
or not, without anybody noticing them. So to point to uncontested as
something that people defer to, seems to be not quite the verb. It is
not that they are deferring.
PROFESSOR GREENE: I completely agree with that.
PROFESSOR LESSIG: Okay. The last point is really excellent.
The claim is this: Let's see how far this idea of contested and uncon-
tested discourses can get us. Jack Balkin, in his paper, says quite
forcefully, many people think Bowers v. Hardwick2 is more incorrect
than Dandridge v. Williams' or that economic inequality is more con-
sistent with our constitutional tradition than denying rights to homo-
sexuals; Abner asks the question, How is that possible? I think Abner
is absolutely right to focus on what it is in our interpretive context that
makes it possible for us to be such economic inegalitarians.
For consider where we have been: Here is Frank Michelman sitting
in the front row. In 1969, he writes a piece that simply doesn't live in
this world anymore.4 Why? Did he just not understand our constitu-
tional tradition then? Was he just uneducated at what constitutional-
ism was? I don't think so.
1. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
2. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
3. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
4. Frank Michelman, The Supreme Cour4 1968 Term-Foreword: On Protecting
the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 Harv. L Rev. 7 (1969).
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It is to remark a change in the world to note that Professor
Michelman can write one of the most influential articles of the 1960s
that now is so alien. It is an odd piece - beautiful, and wonderful and
we can dream about it. But still it is a piece that none of us would
write anymore. That's a reflection of something about how our back-
ground has changed, about what these changes can bring up, and what
they can suppress, to note that what was great then could not be
imagined now.
There is lots that these background changes can bring up. Again,
MacKinnon's work raises the same point, but this time the other way
round: who would have expected, prior to her work, the changes we
have seen, because of her work? Who would have said that what
MacKinnon did was consistent or fit with our constitutional past?
Where was the fit? The answer is that there wasn't a fit: That instead,
we were made to fit. We were remade in a way that now it seems to us
consistent with earlier principles.
When I talk about these changes as constraints on fidelity, what I
mean to say by that is that as they remake us, we are given a Constitu-
tion that is in an important way different from the constitution the
framers gave us. It has a connection and a tradition that works its way
through this practice of interpretation. So, I think a faithful interpre-
tation of the Constitution that says that Romer v. Evans5 is right. But
it certainly is a different Constitution. This change in our way of look-
ing at the world constrains us, it stops us from being able to embrace
the world that the framers had.
The uncontested defines who we can't be anymore. About views
different from the uncontested, we have to say that, we can't be that
part anymore, we have to give that up. The enterprise of fidelity is
constantly this imperfect enterprise that tries to carry as much as it
can, knowing that there are some things that will be untranslatable.
Some things we can't say that anymore. That sounds like infidelity,
but I suggest it is just a constraint on the practice of fidelity.
PROFESSOR GREENE: What we will do first is see if any of the
panelists want to respond and then we will take questions.
PROFESSOR LEVINSON: I think there is a conflation betweenjudges and constitutional interpreters, or people who want to bejudges. One reason that a lot of people won't write Frank's article, is
see what happened to Peter Edelman. He did write Frank's article in
the mid 1980s, and it cost him a federal judgeship. So, to the extent
that the highest aspiration of legal academics is to make the judiciary
rather than to speak truth about what the Constitution means regard-
less of political consequences, you will get one sort of article rather
than another sort of article. What kind of constraint is it? Is it a con-
straint internal to the enterprise, that what we are really about is pre-
5. 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996)
1510 [Vol. 65
FIDELITY AS TRANSLATION
dicting what judges will say? We are predicting what the Senate
Judiciary Committee will say, so, therefore, what we write has to fit
what they think? That certainly is a constraint, but I don't think it is
internal to an enterprise of fidelity; it has to do with political ambition.
We need to keep separate what sorts of articles we as tenured aca-
demics ought to be able to write, even in the late 1990s, and what sort
of articles we are advised to write if we have ambitions other than
maintaining our tenured jobs in the future.
PROFESSOR CALABRESI: I guess I agree, it takes a story to
beat a story and I can't fully provide that story in the space of a re-
sponse. I think that the story would have to be what I would call
sophisticated originalism, which I think really doesn't resemble the
one-step originalism or the specific intentionalism that is sometimes
mentioned here. I think that the essential argument that has been
advanced by what I would call sophisticated originalists is that where
the text is very specific, as in setting up three branches of the national
government or providing two Senators from every state, there aren't
meaning shifts. Where the text is more open-ended, the no caste-
based discrimination principle of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
original applications, the paradigm cases, as Jed was talking about, re-
main binding, but there is the potential for growth and accommoda-
tion of change in the meaning of the word over time. The same thing
with the cruel and unusual punishment provision of the Eighth
Amendment.
I found myself agreeing with much of what Jed was saying about
how constitutionalism works and also about the importance of it, both
as an intergenerational law-making enterprise and as a way of en-
trenching fundamental rights. It clearly is something that we as a soci-
ety are very committed to, as evidenced by all of our state
constitutions, the fact that we have always had written constitutions,
and by the fact that we have done such a great job of selling the rest of
the world on constitutionalism, which suggests that we had better
hope that we were right in doing that.
PROFESSOR GREENE: Questions from the floor?
QUESTION FROM PROFESSOR MARY ANNE CASE: I have
a question for Jed. Does your view mean that the state of Utah may
now establish the Mormon church?
PROFESSOR RUBENFELD: Things are different after the Four-
teenth Amendment. You are referring to what people call the original
understanding of the First Amendment, which is that it is okay to es-
tablish. So then I ask you, what about the Fourteenth Amendment?
On my theory, what is prohibited by the First Amendment, in its origi-
nal understanding, is the paradigm case, and is what is binding. What
is permitted by it, is not. I don't care if every single framer and ratifier
of the Fourteenth Amendment thought that women got no protection,
every single one of them thought that women could be denied en-
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trance to the bar and so on. And that was part of the reason why they
wouldn't have voted for it. It doesn't matter to me. You look at the
paradigm case of what they intended to abolish, what the Constitution
intended to abolish, and from that, you derive principles.
PROFESSOR GREENE: Questions?
QUESTION FROM THE AUDIENCE: My question is for Profes-
sor Lessig, and concerns the Naturalization and Bankruptcy Clause,
the fourth clause of Article I, Section 8, which is the only one of the
eighteen clauses that combines two absolutely discrete subject mat-
ters, naturalization and bankruptcy. I assume that the import of that
clause is actually uniformity, which is mentioned, which is procedural.
How do you translate that into the present day, using your theory or
any of them? You have millions of people affected by pending law on
immigration and naturalization-it is a deconstruction of the former
American law in that area, and bankruptcy, which was viewed as
wicked and evil, I suppose-when the Framers wrote the Constitution.
Now we have hundreds of thousands of such cases each year. How do
you translate that clause into these very markedly significant two sub-
ject matters today? Originalism simply doesn't work in my view.
Originalism is irrelevant in that particular clause. How would you
deal with that?
PROFESSOR LESSIG: I agree with you that their understandings
of immigration and naturalization in bankruptcy certainly were differ-
ent. But the idea that these differences in understanding would create
a terribly difficult problem for the scope of the power that Congress
has, I don't see. So, if the question is, how do we interpret the scope
of Congress's power over these areas, I think you are right, it does
turn to the question of significance and uniformity. But about that I
don't know enough.
QUESTION FROM PROFESSOR MCCONNELL: I have a ques-
tion for Larry. I find the account actually rather persuasive. At least
if we see it as a positive account. I am not sure what I think of it as a
normative account. But I have this question. I don't understand why
when a question becomes contested that it is therefore awarded to one
side or the other constitutionally. It would seem to me that it is when
the issue becomes largely uncontested that it becomes understood as a
constitutional principle, and until then it would be understood as be-
ing within the range of reasonable minds may differ, and the political
process prevails. That account would seem to explain the history a
little bit better, if this is a positive account, because when the Four-
teenth Amendment was written, there was, in fact, a consensus with
regard to racial discrimination, a consensus reflected in two-thirds of
both houses of Congress and three-quarters of the states, albeit under
the boot of Yankee force, but nonetheless consensus, expressed rather
dramatically. As that consensus broke down in the 1870s, 1880s and
even more so in the 1890s, then they began to leave it back to the
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political process and Plessy vs. Ferguson6 would seem to be a result of
a loosening of the old consensus and now it returns to politics.
And by the way, as of Plessy, you certainly cannot say there was a
consensus in favor of segregation. Segregation was very much a hotly
politically contested proposition. Segregation laws were still being de-
feated in state legislatures in the South well into the 1890s. But it was
contested and, therefore, left to politics.
And then I would suggest, when at least elite opinion ceased to see
it as being contested anymore, it becomes reconstitutionalized. The
most you can say about the gender cases is they may have been a few
years too early, not very many, and maybe the problem with Romer, if
there is a problem with Romer, is that it assumes that we have reached
a higher degree of consensus than in fact the nation has on that issue,
yet.
PROFESSOR LESSIG: You have to distinguish between consen-
sus about, again using Dworkin's terms, the outcome, and consensus
about justifications for deviating from what I would think of as de-
fault-a default of equality.
I don't think America today has a consensus about gay rights and
about equal protection for gays. But I do think that the best reading of
the Equal Protection Clause now must recognize gay rights and equal
protection for gays. It must now recognize that because its demand is
equality, and because the reasons for inequality-for discriminating
against gays-are now fundamentally contested. Given this contest,
equal protection now demands that gays be treated equally across all
these ranges of practices that they are not treated equally now.
The fact that there isn't a consensus politically, about the conclusion
that the Equal Protection Clause requires, might be good reason for a
Bickelian-like prudence about how should we move forward and what
are the steps we should take. I am skeptical of that sort of prudence.
But the lack of consensus about the outcome doesn't change the cor-
rect outcome.
The kind of consensus that I am talking about, or the contestedness
that I am talking about, goes to the very understanding of what the
Constitution requires. The fact that the justification for discriminating
against gays is now contested in a way that the justifications for eco-
nomic inequality are not, however wrong I might think this mix of
contestedness is, has much to do with an overlapping set of views that
from all sorts of perspective make it seem to make sense that inequal-
ity is permitted. The overlapping grounds for this sort of inequality
are now contested.
PROFESSOR GREENE: Let me just push you for one second on
this. Is your claim with regard to any rights claim that when the gov-
ernment justification for years is backgrounded, submerged, under-
6. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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stood without much reflection, then there comes a time when it
becomes in the open, it becomes contested? For example, under-
standings about race or gender or sexual orientation. Your claim in
the paper and today has been about the Equal Protection Clause, that
when that happens, this is what I take you to be saying to Michael, the
government justification weakens so much that the government
should lose and the rights claim should win. Is that true also for free
speech, freedom of religion, substantive due process, etc., etc.?
PROFESSOR LESSIG: The truth is I never thought about rights
until I had to talk at Larry Sager and Chris Eisgruber's colloquium,
and then I went to Virginia and I had to talk with Michael Klarman
about the same thing, and some other people in Virginia who forced
me to think about it. I don't know yet how it works out in the First
Amendment and in these other areas. Of course, I have a prediction,
and the prediction is of course that it will turn out to be consistent in
these areas as well. But the First Amendment is a relatively easy prob-
lem to work out like this, because you do see these weird shifts in First
Amendment jurisprudence as different ideas here get backgrounded.
Think of Geof Stone-like First Amendment jurisprudence, back-
grounded until the work of MacKinnon and Dworkin throws this
backgrounded part into contestation. There is a story here to be fig-
ured out, I just haven't done it yet.
But I want to be very narrow right now and just say look, think
about equal protection. I know Sandy is really upset because I have
written so many articles trying to do this and he is worried about the
weight of yet another one, so perhaps I will just think about it myself.
PROFESSOR GREENE: I think we have time for one more ques-
tion. The gentleman-oh, Professor Dworkin.
PROFESSOR DWORKIN: First, on the question of how economic
justice might be put back on the table. I think that is a wonderful
question. I suppose putting the question that way suggests that it is off
the table. The fact that Frank might or might not write the same arti-
cle again, doesn't show it is off the table. To my mind, what would
show it is off the table is showing that the argument for it is not a good
argument. That is something that I actually think is so now, but it is
certainly contestable.
How would it get back on the table? That depends on what you
take the data set for constitutional interpretation to be. I am disposed
to think that it includes such things as legislation, referenda, and the
kind of phenomena that you are talking about.
So, it may be that what was a competent interpretation of the basic
rights protected by the document would no longer be competent be-
cause it wouldn't fit the data set. That seems to me perfectly right.
Sandy Levinson, with respect to your remarks, a couple of observa-
tions. First, I agree that we translate all the time, you're doing it right
now, because you look as if you are listening to me and trying to make
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sense of what I am saying. That is an exercise in translation. Commu-
nicative interpretation, understanding what one person says to an-
other, requires a theory of interpretation. It may not be a grand one,
but it requires one.
I am not sure, Larry, that you and I mean the same thing by transla-
tion. I was using it this morning in what I thought was a technical way,
because I was trying very hard to distinguish between linguistic inten-
tion and other kinds of intention. I was using it in a way that could be
explicated in terms of truth values, that is a successful translation is
one that preserves truth values.
There is another sense of translation. People sometimes think of
translating an idea as what they call "seeing what it means today."
That is a different kind of exercise, so far as it asks the question, what
would people who were disposed to say that then, say now. That is a
different kind of translation, which wouldn't preserve integrity of
truth values.
Now, about interpretation in general. First, I would suggest to you,
Jed, a couple of emendations. I don't think you are right in saying
that all the theories under discussion in this conference are theories
committed to the independence of interpretation and legitimacy. I
think the opposite. I think they are all committed to the dependence
of interpretation on legitimacy.
To quote the adolescent Dworkin, interpretation aims to make the
best of something. You cannot aim to make the best of the Constitu-
tion without showing or trying to show that it can provide legitimacy.
That's part of the exercise and I think everybody is trying to do that.
There is however a distinction also to be made between questions of
legitimacy as they appear within interpretation and outside it. We try
to show a legal system as legitimate, we interpret it that way, but we
might fail to show it legitimate. And that, I take it, is the question
posed for the last session of this Symposium: suppose we have shown
what fidelity to this document would require--can we justify that
fidelity?
One further observation about interpretation. Let's distinguish
what I absolutely agree is a requirement of any theory of interpreta-
tion, which is self-referential consistency. So far as a theory of inter-
pretation is an interpretation of the kind it is trying to explain, it has
to be true of itself. I absolutely agree with that.
You want to distinguish that from something you call self-referen-
tial completeness. The point that you are making is, there is bound to
be a circularity involved in using a notion of anything to validate itself.
That is absolutely right. But think where we would be if we decided
that that kind of circularity was noxious. The first thing to go would
be science and the second would be mathematics. In the case of sci-
ence, you have to assume the soundness of empirical verification in
order to claim that the experimental method is a good method. The
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only thing we can do, and this is what philosophy does, is to try and
construct a large enough picture so that we ask this picture to confront
our conviction as a whole. Philosophers have expressed this in differ-
ent ways. One contemporary influential way of saying it is Rawls's
notion of reflective equilibrium. That's the best we can do. You are
absolutely right. Someone could stand up and say interpretation aims
to make the worst of something and this then makes the worst of in-
terpretation and there you have it. This person would not succeed in
bringing conviction and even more to the point would not even intend
to be bringing conviction. You are imposing too strict a requirement
by requiring that we are able to get outside any part of our thought
entirely and criticize it from an external point of view. It can't be
done.7
Finally, if I have understood you correctly about paradigms, then
you say, for example, about the Fourteenth Amendment: you don't
care what they thought, women can't be treated as second-class citi-
zens in the way that you describe.
That's true. But I want to press the question: in virtue of what is it
true? There would be another view to take of the paradigm. Michael
McConnell will tell you that other people can have other thoughts
about this. You think yours is right, so do I, but in virtue of what is it
right? I think that the answer you give me will constitute your theory
of interpretation, because there is no place else for you to go.
PROFESSOR GREENE: Jed, do you want to respond and then I
know Sandy has a minute, and then we will break.
PROFESSOR RUBENFELD: I am not giving you a theory of gen-
eralized interpretation that I then apply to constitutional adjudication.
I am giving you a specific theory of interpretation that grows out of
political theory-indeed, taking up your invitation that you men-
tioned earlier. Whereas your theory of constitutional interpretation-
although to be sure you bring legitimacy in-doesn't begin with polit-
ical theory, indeed it is something you wish people would do more of.
It begins with an account of interpretation in general.
And although Larry's work isn't universalizing-he is ready to have
interpretation of various kinds of texts-nor do you insist when you
look at the Constitution: "I am thinking about the Constitution's rela-
tion to democratic self-government." It is not political theory. I am
sure you agree there are different kinds of texts. This is what I am
criticizing.
But, yes, I certainly think normative judgment, considerations of
justice reappear when we try to decide what the paradigm case means.
I am perfectly content to agree with that. When you talked about
legitimacy in your remarks here, you equated it with justice. When
7. Professor Dworkin expands upon these points in his comments on Professor
Rubenfeld. See Ronald Dworkin, Reflections on Fidelity, 65 Fordham L. Rev. (1997).
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you say that your account is going to make the Constitution the most
legitimate it can be or that it wouldn't be possible to interpret the
South African Constitution in order to make it legitimate, you have
done the separation already that I am saying you can't do. To figure
out how judges are to interpret a constitution, you have to decide
whether and how this constitution exercises legitimate authority. You
don't decide first how you interpret our text. Is it text, let's figure out
how to interpret texts, or maybe texts that are old, or maybe certain
kinds of text as opposed to poetry or something. No, you have to
think about what a constitution is, its legitimate place in democratic
self-government, and then we know how to interpret.
PROFESSOR LEVINSON: I think I agree with every single word
that Ronald Dworkin said. I agree, I was trying to understand you, I
was trying to interpret you. But the real question is, if this session had
been titled Fidelity as Interpretation, or Fidelity as Understanding,
would we have a different question to be discussing than Fidelity as
Translation?
I take it that part of what Larry is doing is suggesting that transla-
tion purchases us something. I was fascinated, too, about fifteen years
ago, when I commissioned the student translation, by George
Steiner's book After Babel. One of the things all of us know is that we
are constantly being besieged with new things to learn, structural an-
thropology, economics, whatever. And so a practical question is
whether we have to start learning some translation theory and look at
what happens if you take the term as something more than a momen-
tary heuristic.
But of course I agree with you that informally I am trying to trans-
late you and I am not going to get angry at somebody who talks about
translation. I think Larry's articles are really splendid. The question
is just how much weight do we want to put on this word as offering us
a brand new insight that we don't already have from talking for the
last twenty years about interpretation and understanding. That's the
only issue.
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